University of Richmond

UR Scholarship Repository
History Faculty Publications

History

1998

Worrying about the Civil War
Edward L. Ayers
University of Richmond, eayers@richmond.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/history-faculty-publications
Part of the Cultural History Commons, Military History Commons, and the Political History
Commons
Recommended Citation
Ayers, Edward L. "Worrying about the Civil War." In Moral Problems in American Life: New Perspectives on Cultural History, edited by
Karen Halttunen and Lewis Perry, 145-165. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998.

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the History at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in History
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Worrying about the Civil War
EDWARD

L. AYERS

In 1995 the United States Post Office issued a stamp set commemorating the end of the Civil War; the set's motto was "Once Divided. Now Perforated." The stamps balanced carefully-Lee and Grant, Davis and Lincoln, Clara Barton and Phoebe Pember, Sherman and Jackson, the Monitor
and the Virginia, Harriet Tubman and Mary Chesnut, Chancellorsville and
Gettysburg. The banners across the top also gave equal time, describing
the conflict both as the "Civil War" and the "War Between the States." At
the same time the federal government sold that artfully poised historical
document, however, an episode of The Simpsons, a popular animated satire of American life, conveyed a different kind of message. Apu, an industrious South Asian immigrant in the Simpsons' hometown of Springfield,
U.S.A., has studied hard for his citizenship test. The final question on the
oral quiz is, predictably, "What was the cause of the Civil War?" ''Actually,
there were numerous causes," begins Apu. ''Aside from the obvious schism
between the abolitionists and the anti-abolitionists, there were economic
factors, both domestic and inter--." The official, clearly bored with such
superfluous erudition, intones flatly, 'Just say slavery." Apu eagerly concedes the point-"Slavery it is, sir"-and wins his citizenship. 1
The Civil War has never been more popular. Soldiers on both sides of
1 An instructive overview of other current uses of the war is Jim Cullen, The Civil War in
Popular Culture: A Reusable Past (Washington, D.C., 1995). On The Simpsons, see the tran-

script for the episode "Much Apu about Nothing," written by David S. Cohen and directed
by Susie Dietter, production code 3F20, original airdate in North America: May 5, 1996,
capsule revision C:June io, 1996, in "The Simpsons Archive" on the World Wide Web,
http://www.snpp.com/.
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the war receive reverential treatment from magazines that lovingly examine every facet of the war, from cavalry to cooking, reporting on battles as
if they are late-breaking news. Reenactors gather at battlefields, getting
the feel of heavy wool clothing on a suffocating August day, of a heavy rifle,
stiff boots, and hardtack. The "Confederacy" finds no shortage of those
willing to play the role of the gallant losers. Civil War encyclopedias, atlases, biographies, sweeping surveys, and minutely detailed volumes devoted to single days of battle fill the history sections at bookstores across
America. The business sections of those bookstores often carry Donald T.
Phillips's Lincoln on Leadership: Executive Strategi,es for Tough Times, in which
Phillips proclaims that Lincoln steered the country through the war "with
a naturalness and intuitiveness in leading people that was at least a century
ahead of his time." Lincoln's lessons to today's executives include "Get Out
of the Office and Circulate among the Troops" and "Keep Searching Until You Find Your 'Grant."' For the Southern point of view, the businessperson can consult From Battlefield to Boardroom: The Leadership Lessons of
Robert E. Lee, by Bil Holton, Ph.D. 2
There is no animosity in any of these historical or practical interpretations of the Civil War. It is clear that the North fought for purposes entirely
good-for Union and the end of slavery-but Confederate soldiers also
win respect for their bravery, their devotion, and their struggle against long
odds. They seem to have been playing historical roles for which they are not
to blame. The reenactors, the books in stores, and the battlefield tours generally avoid talking about the cause of the war, focusing instead on the
common bravery and hardships of soldiers North and South. The war has
become common property, with the treacherous parts helpfully roped off.
Michael Shaara's The Killer Angels, the most acclaimed fictional portrayal
of the Civil War since Gone with the Wind, bears the major hallmarks of the
current understanding of the war. Shaara's 1974 novel and the 1994 movie
based on it, Gettysburg, view the conflict from the perspectives of men on
both sides of the battle. We glimpse the anguish of Lee and Longstreet, the
uncertainty and glory ofJoshua Chamberlain, and the humanity of all involved. The moral centerpiece of both the book and the film is an IrishAmerican Union sergeant's soliloquy on freedom and dignity. The book,
like other representations of the Civil War in recent decades, combines a
respect for the warriors on both sides with an idealistic vision of the war's
purpose. 3
2 Donald T. Phillips, Lincoln on Leadership: Executive Strategies for Tough Times (New York,
1992), 173. First published in 1992 and now in its eighth printing, the book bears rows
of endorsements from prominent political figures, coaches, and corporate leaders. Bil
Holton, From Battl.efield to Boardroom: The Leadership Lessons of Robert E. Lee (Novato, Calif.,
1995).
3
Michael Shaara, The Kill.er Angels ( 1974; paperback ed., New York, 197 5); Gettysburg, a
film directed by Ronald F. Maxwell, 1994.
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The paperback edition of The Kil/,er Angels carries the imprimatur of
the two leading interpreters of the war. James McPherson calls Shaara's
book his "favorite historical novel," and Ken Bums tells readers that the
book changed his life: "I had never visited Gettysburg, knew almost nothing about that battle before I read the book, but here it all came alive." A
work on the Civil War could not have more influential endorsements. McPherson's Battle Cry of Freedom and Bums's television series The Civil War
have shaped the ways millions of Americans understand the central event
in their nation's history. In 1988, McPherson's history of the Civil War won
the Pulitzer Prize and remained ensconced for months at the top of the
bestseller list. In 1991, Bums's nine-part series attracted the largest audience ever to watch public television in the United States and became a
nationwide media event. Both men have gained growing audiences over
the years, their works becoming fixtures in the nation's libraries and
classrooms. McPherson has produced a steady stream of books and essays since Battle Cry of Freedom, amplifying his basic tenets about the war's
cause and conduct. Episodes of Bums's film are often the first sustained
exposure young Americans have to the Civil War and a major influence
on those who have already finished their schooling. Many people have
purchased their own copies of the tapes so they can watch them whenever
theywish. 4
Different media create different emphases, of course. Bums assembled
an impressive team of academic historians to guide him, including McPherson, yet Bums is most interested in uncovering and recovering the feelings
of the past. He offers an impressionistic account of the war, full of quotation, image, and sound. He focuses on the battlefields but uses private expressions oflove and grief to powerful effect. McPherson, by contrast, is a
professional historian, attuned to the debates, standards, and innovations
of the academy. Like Bums, McPherson is most interested in the battles,
but he connects the military conflict to politics and the social structures of
the North and the South more rigorously than his counterpart.
Despite their different purposes and means, however, the interpretations of Bums and McPherson share a common perspective. They both
dramatize the ways that antislavery opinion, progress, war, and national
identity intertwined at the time of the Civil War so that each element became inseparable from the others. Slavery stands as the antithesis of prog4 James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York, 1988); The Civil
War, a nine-part documentary film directed by Ken Bums and shown by the Public Broadcasting System in 1990. McPherson has deepened and extended his interpretation in several
books since Battle Cry ofFreedom, including Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution
(New York, 1991), What They Fought For, r86r-r865 (Baton Rouge, 1994), Drawn with the
Sword: Reflections on the American Civil War (New York, 1996), and For Cause and Comrades: Why
Men Fought in the Civil War (New York, 1997). McPherson's earlier overview of the era was
called Ordeal by Fire: The Civil War and &construction (New York, 1982).
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ress, shattering nation and creating war; war is the means by which antislavery feeling spreads and deepens; the turn against slavery during the
war re-creates national identity; the new nation is freed for a more fully
shared kind of progress. This story has become common sense to Americans: emancipation, war, nation, and progress all seem part of one story,
the same story.
Both Burns and McPherson make sophisticated use of their preferred
medium. Burns explains the coming of the war in just a few minutes of his
long film, introducing the cotton gin and portraying the resulting conflicts
as the inevitable result of the growth of slavery. Familiar faces and events
flash past, from William Lloyd Garrison to Frederick Douglass to Harriet
Beecher Stowe to Abraham Lincoln, from Bleeding Kansas to Harper5
Ferry to Fort Sumter. McPherson, by contrast, spends hundreds of page5
explaining the origins of the war. Like Burns, McPherson uses quotation.
extensively and effectively; he lets the words of his protagonists carry hi1'
story. Persuasive Northern speakers come in at key points to make the lib··
eral and nationalist statements attractive to McPherson.
White Northerners, white Southerners, and black Americans all grow
morally during the war that Burns and McPherson portray. The white Nortb
comes truly to abhor slavery; white Southerners recognize the limits of
their power and the meaning of full nationhood; black Americans gain not
only freedom but also heightened dignity when they take up arms for theii
freedom. Abraham Lincoln embodies this moral growth of his nation, a~
the slaughter on the battlefield gradually persuades the cautious presidenf
that the war must become a war against slavery. Lincoln's transformation
represents that of the North as a whole, and his assassination brings the
story to its end. 5
Burns and McPherson hold up the story of the Civil War as an inspiration to Americans of today. As Burns puts it, "If there's one political theme
in this film, it's this: The Civil War is a chronicle of making permanent
that which was promised, but not delivered, in the Declaration of Inde-.
pendence and the Constitution." McPherson, long known as a historian of
abolitionism, stresses that the war was about freedom in its many manifestations. "Lincoln led the country through the worst of times to a triumph
that left America stronger, more free, and more democratic," he has written recently. "And that offers a lesson not only for Americans but also for
'the whole family of man."' These historians celebrate the outcome of a
5
As a recent survey observes, Lincoln "now enjoys extremely high approval-ratings"; older
"doubts and reservations seem to have evaporated." Michael Perman, "Lincoln, the Civil War,
and the New Approval Ratings," American Studies 36 (Spring 1995): 131-34. Penetrating
comments on McPherson's interpretation appear in Michael Johnson, "Battle Cry of Freedom?" Reviews in American History 17 (June 1989): 214-18, and in Jon L. Wakelyn's review
of Battle Cry ofFreedom in Civil War History 34 (December 1988): 344-47.
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war that put the country on the long path to the civil rights movement
and greater equality. Their powerful histories tell a story offreedom emerging through the trial of war, of a great nation becoming greater through
suffering.6
Despite the harrowing picture of war in Burns's film, where severed
limbs and bleaching bones appear frequently and memorably, his North
and South are engaged in a collaborative effort. "Between 1861 and 1865,
Americans made war on each other and killed each other in great numbers," Burns's narrator David McCullough tells viewers early in the film, "if
only to become the kind of country that could no longer conceive of how
that was possible." The beginning and the end of the war fuse into one; the
soldiers kill each other for the common purpose of discovering the depth
and the nature of their nationalism. The final scene in Burns's epic shows
footage from 1913, when aging veterans of Gettysburg return to the_ scenes
of carnage to stroll peacefully together through fields now regrown green
and alive. McPherson has less of a reconciliationist bent than Burns, but
he uses the first page of his book to emphasize that versions of the song
"The Battle Cry of Freedom" were popular in both the North and the
South. His title is nonpartisan. 7
Burns and McPherson work hard to protect the memory of the war.
They defend its integrity from the evasions of those who insist that the
South fought for something other than slavery; they guard it from those
who emphasize the North's narrow self-interest; they protect it from the
many historians who hold military history in disdain; they shield it from
cynics on both the right and the left. For Burns and McPherson, the war's
sacrifices must not be wasted; the people of the United States must not become unaware and unappreciative of what was at stake and what was won.
McPherson continually reminds Americans, as his recent book titles put it,
"what they fought for," that "we cannot escape history," that Lincoln led
"the second American Revolution," and that soldiers fought "for cause
and comrades." He has spearheaded efforts to protect battlefields, "sacred
soil," from development.
McPherson is so vigilant because he recognizes that this interpretation
has become established only after long struggle. The elegance and directness with which he and Burns tell their stories can lead us to forget what
a complicated event the Civil War was. It was, after all, simultaneously a
6 Bums's press kit for The Civil War, quoted in Cullen, Civil War in Popular Culture, 11 ;James
M. McPherson, ed., "We Cannot Escape History": Lincoln and the Last Best Hope ofEarth (Urbana,
Ill., 1995), 12.
7 Geoffrey C. Ward, with Ric Bums and Ken Bums, The Civil War: An filustrated History
(New York, 1990). xix. For stimulating and divergent discussions of the issues raised by
Bums's series, see Robert Brent Toplin, ed., Ken Bums's "The Civil War": Historians Respond
(New York, 1996).
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war among citizens and among states, a war fought by disciplined soldier citizens and a war that continually threatened to spin out of anyone's control, a war whose opponents were driven by hatred and yet who quickly
reconciled when it became convenient, a war in which slavery died at
the hands of soldiers who often fought against slavery reluctantly and
even then because slavery's destruction seemed the only practical way to
win. The current interpretations contain these tensions in an overarching
story of emergent freedom and reconciliation. While acknowledging the
complicated decisions people faced, Bums and McPherson resolve them
through narrative. White Northerners, including Lincoln, announce early
on that the war is not about slavery, but the words do not disturb us because we know these people change their minds later on. White Southerners claim plausible support from the Constitution, but their arguments
have little weight because they lost the war and thus their arguments.
Black Americans denounce the war at first as irrelevant or worse, but wlknow they were, fortunately, mistaken.
So self-evident does the dominant interpretation seem that many Americans of today never suspect how hotly historians have contested these issues throughout much of the twentieth century. Although vestiges of older
interpretations still crop up in people's vague recollections, no one ha~
stepped forward in a very long time to offer a popularly accepted counterargument to the explanation codified in Bums and McPherson. Majof
American thinkers last offered strong dissent three decades ago, wherl
Robert Penn Warren and Edmund Wilson expressed visions of the Civil
War that now seem startling in their vehemence and skepticism. Wilsorl
made audacious comparisons in his influential book Patriotic Gore, a survey
of wartime writing. ''All animals must prey on some form of life that thef
can capture, and all will eat as much as they can," Wilson dryly observed a~
he compared the North and the South to sea slugs he had seen in a Waif
Disney documentary. Man is different only because he "has succeeded ir:1
cultivating enough of what he calls 'morality' and 'reason' to justify whaf
he is doing in terms of what he calls 'virtue' and 'civilization."' Abraharr
Lincoln, Wilson thought, should be grouped with other leaders who sought
to build nations through force and appeal to transcendent meaning: Bis.'
marck and Lenin.s
Robert Penn Warren offered a more generous, yet still critical, medita.'
ti on in his book The Legacy of the Civil War. The war, Warren cautioned, hatl
produced two dangerous habits of mind in Americans. For the South, it of:
fered "the Great Alibi," the great excuse for everything that was wrong oi
lacking in the region. For the North, the war offered "the Treasury ofVir."
8

Edmund Wilson, Patriotic Gare: Studies in the Literature of the American Civil War (New York;

1962), xv-xix.
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tue," in which the war appeared as "a consciously undertaken crusade so
full of righteousness that there is enough overplus stored in Heaven, like
the deeds of the saints, to take care of all the small failings and oversights
of the descendants of the crusaders, certainly unto the present generation."
Warren, like Wilson, did not shun dramatic effect: it was tempting, he argued, for Americans to regard the war as "part of our divinely instituted
success story, and to think, in some shadowy comer of the mind, of the
dead at Gettysburg as a small price to pay for the development of a really
satisfactory and cheap compact car with decent pick-up and road-holding
capability." 9
Wilson and Warren wrote during the one-hundredth anniversary of the
war-"this absurd centennial," Wilson called it-when histories, plays,
reenactments, products, and commemorations of all sorts proliferated.
Wilson and Warren wrote to dampen the self-righteousness and materialism to which Americans inclined in those stressful years of the cold war.
The two authors considered themselves voices in the wilderness, delivering jeremiads, for a once-powerful tradition of skepticism about the Civil
War had crumbled and a new tradition of acceptance and celebration was
rising in its place. 10
The. skeptical viewpoint had peaked decades earlier, in the 1920s and
1930s, when "revisionism" flourished. The "revisionists" challenged the
comforting bargain put forward in the years before World War I by Southern journalists such as Henry Grady and scholars such as Woodrow Wilson.
Without sacrificing any respect for the Lost Cause, the reconciliationist
bargain admitted that secession had been a mistake and that the nation
should never have been divided. It argued that emancipation had been
a fortunate ·occurrence for the white South, for whom slavery had been a
burden. Southerners who made such concessions won in return the admission by white Northerners that Reconstruction and its elevation of
black Southerners had been a mistake. This understanding of the Civil
War, in other words, was simultaneously antislavery and racist, emphasizing the triumph of white reconciliation and progress at the expense of
black rights. All white people emerged from the conflict looking high
minded and principled.11
Charles and Mary Beard's immensely popular Rise of American Civilization, first published in 1927 and reflecting the disillusionment that fol9 Robert Penn Warren, The Legacy of the Civil War: Meditations on the Centennial (New York,
1961), 64, 49-50.
10 Wilson, Patriotic Gore, xxxi. A blistering assessment of the Civil War from the perspective
of the centennial also appears in Oscar Handlin, "The Civil War as Symbol and Actuality,"
Massachusetts Review 3 (Autumn 1961 ): 133-43.
11 Willie Lee Rose discusses the tum-of-the-century sectional compromise in Race and Region in American Historical Fiction: Four Episodes in Popular Culture (Oxford, 1979), 21-24.
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lowed World War I, scoffed at this interpretation. They argued that neither
side had been high minded, that the Civil War had been fought over neither slavery nor states' rights. Rather, economic issues stood paramount.
"If the southern planters had been content to grant tariffs, bounties, subsidies, and preferences to northern commerce and industry," the Beards
declared, "it is not probable that they would have been molested in their
most imperious proclamations of sovereignty." The skeptical view broadened and deepened throughout the 1930s. In The Repressible Conflict of
1939, Avery Craven argued that the Civil War should be judged by its consequences and that those consequences looked bleak indeed at the end of
the 1930s: the black American had escaped "little of the hard fate destined
for his race in 1850. Industrial capitalism, with the banners ofrighteousness, patriotism, and progress over its head and with all critics hushed in
disgrace and defeat, went on to its fullness and perhaps its ruin." Something precious had been lost in the Civil War, Craven lamented: "a Constitution which might have protected rights, an agrarian way of life which
might have fostered a rich American culture and a sane economic order,
a decentralized government wherein individuals and localities might have
realized a more satisfactory democracy." Craven believed, along with many
Americans, that those dreams had died with the Civil War. 12
In 1940James G. Randall delivered his presidential address to the leading organization of historians of the United States. In the address, titled
"The Blundering Generation," he concluded that "the Civil War mind
seems a sorry melange of party bile, crisis melodrama, inflated eloquence,
unreason, religious fury, self-righteousness, unctuous self-deception, and
hate." The war could, and should, have been avoided, Randall argued, for
it was not fought over irreconcilable differences between the North and
the South. Randall, like his fellow revisionists, thought he was moving discussion of the war to more realistic grounds, puncturing Northern arrogance and Southern apology. The Civil War was not to be glorified. It stoocl
as an example of how democratic politics could run out of control, of the
way moral absolutism could blind people to their own faults and to the
consequences of their actions. 13
12 Charles Beard and Mary Beard, The Rise of American Civilization (New York, 1927),
51-54; Avery 0. Craven, The Repressibl.e Conflict, 1830-1861 (Baton Rouge, 1939), 62-63.
For useful overviews see Thomas J. Pressly, Americans Interpret Their Civil War ( 1954; 2d ed ..
New York, 1962); David Donald, "American Historians and the Causes of the Civil War," Soutft
Atlantic Quarterly 59 (Summer 1960): 351-55; David M. Potter, "The Literature on the Back,
ground of the Civil War," in The South and the Sectional Conflict (Baton Rouge, 1968), 87-150;
Peter Novick, That Nobl.e Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Professio'll
(Cambridge, 1988), 72-80, 234-38, 354-59; Michael Perman, The Coming of the America#
Civil War, 3d ed. (Lexington, Mass., 1993).
1' James G. Randall, "The Blundering Generation," Mississippi Vall.ey Historical Review 27
(June 1940): 18.
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Such claims did not go completely uncontested, for black historians
warned that such views distorted all American history. Throughout the
Gilded Age, abolitionists such as Frederick Douglass, trying to create a
usable past, argued in vain that the war had been fought over slavery. In
1935, during the peak of revisionism, W. E. B. Du Bois argued that the
Beards' work created the "comfortable feeling that nothing right or wrong
is involved. Manufacturing and industry develop in the North; agrarian
feudalism develops in the South. They clash, as winds and waters strive,
and the stronger forces develop the tremendous industrial machine that
governs us so magnificently and selfishly today." Du Bois wondered how
"anyone who reads the Congressional Globe from i 8 50 to 1860, the lives of
contemporary statesmen and public characters, North and South, the discourses in the newspapers and accounts of meetings and speeches, [could]
doubt that Negro slavery was the cause of the Civil War?" Du Bois granted
that the "North went to war without the slightest idea of freeing the slave"
but showed how the abolitionists and the slaves themselves forced Lincoln
into making the war a war against slavery. These arguments won little attention or respect from white historians. This was the heyday of revisionism: "everyone" knew the war had been a mistake. 14
Yet revisionism, so powerful in the first half of the twentieth century,
faded away with remarkable speed in the second half. No sooner had World
War II ended than commentators called for a rethinking of the dominant
skeptical interpretation of the Civil War. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. argued in
1949 that the revisionists, despite their claims to the contrary, had been
"sentimentalists," insensitive to the evil of slavery and excessively squeamish
about using violence to end it. "The unhappy fact is that man occasionally
works himself into a log-jam; and that logjam must be burst by violence,"
Schlesinger lectured. "We know that well enough from the experience of
the last decade." In 1953, the year that James Randall died, the black historian Benjamin Quarles published his Negro in the Civil War, arguing that
black people had played central roles in transforming the Civil War into a
war to end slavery. Avery Craven began toning down his earlier views, and
no one picked up the revisionist banner. David Donald, a student of Randall's who, more than any other leading scholar, seemed sympathetic to
the revisionists, explained in 1960 why the perspective no longer won converts: "To those who reached maturity during the years when irresistible
and complex forces brought the United States, and the whole civilized
14 David W. Blight, "'For Something beyond the Battlefield': Frederick Douglass and the
Struggle for the Memory of the Civil War," Journal of American History 75 (March 1989):
1156-78; W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, Black &construction: An Essay toward a History of the Part
Which Black Folk Played in the Attempt to &construct Democracy in America, 1860-1880 (New
York, 1935), 714-16.
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world, into a disastrous world war, it no longer seems so simple to unravel
the causes of the conflict and to pass out praise and blame like honors at
a college commencement exercise." 15 .
The decline of revisionism was part of a larger rethinking of the American past. Historians in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s changed the way Americans understood nineteenth-century America, reflecting the influence of
the civil rights movement, the War on Poverty, and the counterculture.
Many of the country's most visible historians valued rapid reform, through
nonelectoral means if necessary, far more than they did the political stability, gradual change, and regional compromise championed by the revisionists. A self-consciously reformist, often radical, social history swept the
profession, displaying and analyzing evidence of injustice and dominion.
Southern slaves emerged as fully human, anguished by their bondage and
determined to be free in whatever ways they could. Abolitionists no longer
appeared as deluded zealots but rather as men and women willing to risk
their lives for the highest religious and political ideals. The Republicans
came to be seen primarily as advocates offree labor and economic progress,
hating the South for its political arrogance and its violation of American
virtues. Politicians in general no longer appeared to be blundering but responding, and rather timorously at that, to the very real dilemmas of their
society. 16
Despite penetrating essays and books by historians attentive to the complexities of the party system, no aggressive Civil War revisionism swept over
America in the 1960s. This absence of antiwar thinking is surprising. After
all, if the disappointments following World War I helped create the first revisionism, why did the far greater disillusionment with the war in Vietnam
not create another surge of revisionism? Although disgust with the military and with warfare, with claims of national virtue and innocence, permeated the academy in the late 1960s and early 1970s, only one young
scholar, a graduate student, issued a call for "a new revisionism." In 1969,
he argued that "the limited improvement in the status of the Negro in this
country was not worth the expenditure in lives required to make that improvement possible." 17
15 Arthur Schlesinger Jr., "The Causes of the Civil War: A Note on Historical Sentimentalism," Partisan Review 16 (October 1949): 980, 981; Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the
Civil War (Boston, 1953); Donald, "American Historians," 354. We can trace Craven'~ selfrevisions in his An Historian and the Civil War (Chicago, 1964).
16 Perhaps the most important book in this regard was Eric Foner's Free Soil, Free Labor, Free
Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War (New York, 1970).
17 John S. Rosenberg, "Toward a New Civil War Revisionism," American Scholar 38 (Spring
1969): 261; for the debate that ensued, see the response to Rosenberg in Phillip S. Pa!udan,
"The American Civil War: Triumph through Tragedy," Civil War History 20 (September 1974):
239-50, and John S. Rosenberg, "The American Civil War and the Problem of 'Presentism':
A Reply to Phillip S. Paludan," Civil War History 21 (September 1975): 242-53.
David M. Potter, while not an aggressive revisionist, wrote several brilliant essays in which
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Merely to quote the argument today is to show why it did not succeed:
the antiwar spirit directly conflicted with the other great ideal of the sixties,
black freedom. Revisionists in the 1920s and 1930s had argued that the
end of slavery was not worth six hundred thousand lives because those
historians did not consider slavery intrinsically immoral and certainly
not much worse than what followed. By the late 1960s, however, slavery
seemed so uniquely and undeniably wrong that the calculus of sacrifice
had changed. The moral passion that earlier generations had invested in
explaining why there should have been no Civil War now focused on explaining why the war and Reconstruction had not been more thorough,
why Reconstruction had not been more aggressively supported by confiscation and military power. Scholars' compassion now focused more on
the former slaves than on the soldiers in the war. The war itself became
something of a scholarly backwater, neglected by the leading historians of
nineteenth-century America. The distaste for the war in Vietnam manifested itself in an aversion to any kind of military history, while the fascination with social history made generals and their maneuvers seem irrelevant and boring at best.
Scholars, if not interested in the events on the battlefields, did remain
intrigued by the causes of the Civil War. To scholars mindful of either
mainstream social science or Marxist thought, the North increasingly
appeared as a modem and modernizing society locked in an unavoidable struggle with an antimodern, archaic, and stagnant slave South.
The economic conflict between the two societies no longer seemed one
merely of tariffs and taxes, issues that could have been worked out, but
rather a fundamental clash of free labor and slavery, of the future and
the past. The two societies, historians of widely differing perspectives
came to agree, could not, should not, have coexisted within the same
nation-state. Slavery had to be destroyed as soon as possible, and given the
white South's intransigence, only violence was likely to accomplish that
purpose. 18
By the 1970s and 1980s, in sum, the Civil War no longer appeared as
a moral problem to the people who wrote the major books about the
struggle. Such authors wasted little ink on what had been lost in the war
other than precious lives; they worried little about how the war might have
he asked hard questions about comforting interpretations of the Civil War. They are collected in The South and the Sectional Conflict. While his posthumous and magisterial The Impending Crisis, r848-r86r (New York, 1976) cannot be clearly labeled, Potter's revisionist
leanings are clear in the textbookDivisions and the Stresses of Union, r845-r876 (Glenview, Ill.,
1 973).
18 For an influential statement of this argument, see Eric Foner, "The Causes of the American Civil War: Recent Interpretations and New Directions," Civil War History 20 (September 1974): 197-214.
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been avoided. Slavery displaced other questions that had long agitated
Americans, questions about state power, centralization, democracy, war itself. The Civil War came to seem like bitter medicine the country had to
swallow for its own good.
Today's stories pivot around moments of wartime cohesion, purposefulness, and decision, especially the growing recognition among white Northerners that the war had to be a war to end slavery and not merely one to
save the Union. The war appears as a crucible that burned away the impurities in the Union purpose: this is what Americans were willing to die
for, the story says, this is how America atoned for the sin of slavery. The
Civil War stands as the origins of our better selves, of the time when we
threw off the slavery of our inheritance and became truly American. To
Ken Burns, the war marked the equivalent of a "traumatic event in our
childhood." To James McPherson, a generous reckoning of the war's purposes and consequences can help Americans overcome "the climate of
disillusionment produced by the Vietnam War and the aftermath of the
civil rights movement." 19
So what is wrong with a generous interpretation? After all, it puts the
ideals of democracy and nationhood at the center of the story, offering a
counterweight to those who have appealed to less expansive interpretations of the nation's ideals. It holds up heroes worth emulating. It reconciles the North and South to each other, giving respect where it has not always been found. It places the struggle for black freedom and equality at
the heart of American history. It connects Americans with their past. All
these worthy purposes have been won only after great effort, and a person
of goodwill might think twice before questioning them. And yet if we do
not question them, we close ourselves off from other kinds of understanding and other perspectives on the American nation.
The current interpretation reassures Americans by reconciling the great
anomaly of slavery with an overarching story of a people devoted to liberty.
These stories reassure Americans by reconciling the horrors of fratricidal
war with a vision of a peace-loving republic devoted to democracy and
prosperity. They tell the story of a devastating war so that it seems not merely
unavoidable but transformative and ultimately healing. The stories help
restock Robert Penn Warren's "Treasury of Virtue" in the wake of the war
in Vietnam. White Southerners have been permitted limited access to parts
of the treasury, handed the keys to the rooms that contain honor, bravery,
and even idealism -though not justice. Black Americans have finally been
acknowledged as agents in their own freedom. But it is white Northern
19 According to Bums, "If you see history like the life of a human being, this [the Civil War]
was the traumatic event of our childhood." Newsweek, October 8, 1990, 59; McPherson, Lincoln and the Second American Revolution, 13.
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men who come off best in these stories, martyrs for the Union and the liberty of others. 20
The new interpretation contains little of the cynicism and irony of the
revisionists of the 1920s and 1930s. Today's stories tend to be earnest accounts, clear and linear, with motives and emotions close to the surface.
Indeed, it is in part the very appeal of these stories as stories which makes
them so resistant to revision and which makes them seem so self-evident.
The accounts of the war have a familiar narrative shape; they present an
apparently unresolvable problem and then, after great trials, show its resolution, echoing other basic stories of Western and American culture.
We understand the plot lines of war, dramatized every day on· sports
fields and in action films: good causes and bad, cowardice and bravery,
sacrifice and glory, winners and losers, sudden victories and unexpected
reverses. Fundamental ideas of history, religion, and science, as Hannah
Arendt has argued, incline twentieth-century people to see wars as major
engines of beneficial social change, even as we loathe and fear the conflict
itself. Not only does the Judeo-Christian religious tradition accustom us to
think of violence and blood as necessary accompaniments of progress, but
evolutionism also leads us to conceive of violence as a part of nature, a way
for bad ideas and institutions to be culled. These assumptions, combined
with a widespread belief in the divine favor enjoyed by the United States,
have made it easy for Americans to believe that the Civil War was not
merely necessary but actually good for the country in the long run. 21
Our current understanding of the war makes us impatient with those in
the North-the great majority, at the beginning-who argued that they
were fighting only for the Union, not for the end of bondage. We are befuddled by black Northerners who argued that a war fought to protect
the Union-"this unholy, ill-begotten, would-be Republican government,
that summons all its skill, energy, and might, of money, men, and false philosophy that a corrupt nation can bring to bear, to support, extend, and
perpetuate that vilest of all vile systems, American slavery"-was not a war
worth fighting. We are disappointed with those many white men who died
20 For an example of black agency and white leadership, see Glury, a film directed by
Edward Zwick, 1989. Ironically, Warren served on Bums's team of advisers and is quoted in
the introduction to the book based on the series (Ward, Civil War, xix). Bums focuses on
Warren's statement that the war was so central and complex an event that it tends to create a
personal connection between it and Americans. In many ways, though, Bums's Civil War
seems an example of the sentimental nationalism that Warren warned against thirty years
earlier.
21 McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 858; Thomas Cripps, "Historical Truth: An Interview
with Ken Bums," American Historical Review 100 (June 1995): 741-64; Hannah Arendt,
On Violence (New York, 1970), paraphrased in Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Reflections on War and
Political Discourse: Realism, Just War, and Feminism in a Nuclear Age," in just War Theory
(Oxford, 1992), 270.
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for the Union who would not willingly have risked their lives for the end
of slavery. As the Chicago Times, commenting on Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, put it, "They were men possessing too much self-respect to declare
that negroes were their equals, or were entitled to equal privileges." 22
Garry Wills, in Lincoln at Gettysburg ( i 992), used such quotations to
explain the great transformation of the North. In this best-selling and
prize-winning interpretation of the war, Wills argued that Lincoln, in the
mere 2 7 2 words of the address, cleared "the infected atmosphere of American history itself, tainted with official sins and inherited guilt." Rather
than burning the Constitution because it countenanced slavery, as William
Lloyd Garrison had proposed, Lincoln instead "altered the document from
within, by appeal from its letter to the spirit, subtly changing the recalcitrant stuff of that legal compromise, bringing it to its own indictment."
Lincoln's redefinition of the Constitution to embrace black equality, Wills
admiringly noted, was "one of the most daring acts of open-air sleight-ofhand ever witnessed by the unsuspecting. Everyone in that vast throng of
thousands was having his or her intellectual pocket picked. The crowd departed with a new thing in its ideological luggage, that new constitution
Lincoln had substituted for the one they brought with them." 23 Lincoln
tricked Americans into being better than they really were, into fighting for
a higher cause. Wills's Lincoln transmogrified a war for the Union into a
war for freedom.
There are, of course, scholarly dissenters from this standard interpretation. Historians such as David Potter, J. Mills Thornton, Michael
Holt, William Gienapp, and William Freehling have questioned the political narrative that makes the conflict over slavery seem relatively straightforward, in either the North or the South. Their regions are marked
by strong countercurrents, compromises, and possibilities for alignments
other than those that brought on the war. 24 Other historians have argued
that African Americans did more to free themselves than Abraham Lin22 First quotation from James M. McPherson, The Negro's Civil War: How American Negroes Felt
and Acted during the War for the Union (New York, 1965), 34. The quotation from the Chicago
Times, November 23, 1863, is in Garry Wills, Lincoln at Gettysburg: The Words that Remade America (New York, 1992), 38-39.
23 Wills, Lincoln at Gettysburg, 37-39, 183-85. David Brion Davis has explored, with characteristic subtlety, the conflation of Lincoln with the images associated with individual emancipation. See his "The Emancipation Moment," in Gabor S. Boritt, ed., Lincoln, the War President (New York, 1992), 63-88.
24 Potter, Impending Crisis;]. Mills Thornton III, Politics and Power in a Slave Society: Alabama,
I 8 oo-I 8 60 (Baton Rouge, 1978); Michael F. Holt, The Political Crisis of the I 850s (New York:
Wiley, 1978), and Holt, Political Parties and American Political Development from the Age ofJackson
to the Age of Lincoln (Baton Rouge, 1992); William E. Gienapp, The Origins of the Republican
Party, r852-r856 (New York, 1986); William W. Freehling, The Road to Disunion: The Secessionists at Bay (New York, 1990), and Freehling, The Reintegration of American History: Slavery
and the Civil War (New York, 1994).
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coin ever did. In the eyes of Leon Litwack, Ira Berlin, Barbara Fields, and
Armstead Robinson, the focus on white Northern soldiers and civilians
gives undue credit to reluctant friends of freedom. Without the desperate
efforts by slaves to free themselves, they argue, the Union cause would
have remained a cause for union alone. It was anonymous African Americans who forced Union generals to take a stand on slavery-to recognize
that only by ending slavery could the North win the war. Assuming an implicit and intrinsic push toward freedom on the part of the North, these
historians warn, gives that society far too much moral credit. 25
Other historians have argued that the conflict was considerably more
vindictive, hateful, and destructive than the new orthodoxy emphasizes.
Michael Perman, Charles Royster, Michael Fellman, and Steven Ash stress
the chaotic violence that swirled around the regimented violence of the
war, tormented the border regions from Missouri to occupied South Carolina, ravaged the postwar period throughout the South, and nullified much
that the war claimed to have won. Noncombatants as well as leading generals, these historians show, were often less eager to rejoin the foe as part
of the Union than to see them dead. As Royster puts it, Northerners and
Southerners fell into "visions of purgation and redemption, into anticipation and intuition and spiritual apotheosis, into bloodshed that was not ·
only intentional pursuit ofinterests of state but was also sacramental, erotic,
mystical, and strangely gratifying." Such imagery has little place in the way
most Americans prefer today to remember the war, in which violence was
inflicted almost reluctantly, brother against brother. 26
The dominant story of the war can absorb a great deal of such amendment, however, without changing its fundamental outlines. The standard
interpretation, after all, never makes the war seem painless; in fact, the suffering, struggle, conflict, and uncertainty constitute crucial parts of the
"ordeal by fire" that tried the nation and its ideals. Arguments about the
complexities of the antebellum period can complicate without undermining a belief that the war, as Lincoln put it, was "somehow'' about slavery.
25 On blacks' efforts to strike their freedom, see Leon F. Litwack, Been in the Storm So Long:
The Aftermath of Slavery (New York, 1979); Ira Berlin, Barbara]. Fields, Thavolia Glymph,
Joseph P. Reidy, and Leslie Rowland, eds., Freedom: A Documentary History of Emancipation,
r86r-r867, 1st ser., vol. l (New York, 1985); and Armstead Robinson, "Day ofjubilo: Civil
War and the Demise of Slavery in the Mississippi Valley, l 861-1865" (Ph.D. diss., University
of Rochester, 1976). For strong criticism of Burns on this issue, see Litwack, "Telling the Story:
The Historian, the Filmmaker, and the Civil War," in Toplin, Ken Burnss "The Civil War~

u9-40.
26 Michael Perman, The Road to Redemption: Southern Politics, r869-r879 (Chapel Hill,
l 984); Michael Fellman, Inside War: The Guerrilla Conflict in Missouri during the American Civil
War (New York, 1989); Charles Royster, The Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans (New York, 1991); Michael Fellman, Citizen Sherman: A Life of
William Tecumseh Sherman (New York, 1995); and Stephen V. Ash, When the Yankees Came:
Conflict and Chaos in the Occupied South, r86r-r865 (Chapel Hill, 1995).
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Arguments that Southern slaves helped free themselves can fit into and
even enrich a story of the war that emphasizes the growth ofliberty. Though
arguments about the irrationality, brutality, and bloodthirstiness of the war
may signal a new, darker school of interpretation, defenders of the standard interpretation have argued that the American Civil War actually saw
less inhumanity than most other wars, that the American war was distinguished by the rigor with which soldiers and leaders played by agreedupon rules. Even historians find it hard, in other words, to convey an overall interpretation of the war that fundamentally challenges the one that
has become so deeply entrenched in American culture. 27
This lack of far-reaching debate over the Civil War-so unlike that
which has surrounded other major historical events such as the French
Revolution, the Holocaust, or the cold war-may not be a cause for selfcongratulation. It is not merely that all the evidence is in and accounted
for and historians have finally found the one true interpretation. It may
be, rather, that we like the current story too much to challenge it very
deeply and that we foreclose questions by repeating familiar formulas. The
risk of our apparent consensus is that we paper over the complicated moral
issues raised by a war that left hundreds of thousands of people dead. The
risk is that we no longer worry about the Civil War.
The American Civil War presents great narrative opportunities. No one
could ask for a richer subject, a better plotline of conflict and resolution,
struggle and triumph, good and evil. But with those opportunities also
come temptations. All the struggle, conflict, and uncertainty can appear as
so many plot complications in a story that drives to its natural conclusion.
Because the secession conflict led to the Civil War, war now seems to be the
intention of those who sought to leave the Union. Because the war became
a bloodbath of incalculable scale, that scale now seems inevitable. Because
the war ended with the survival of the Union, that survival now seems the
natural outcome of the war. Because slavery came to an end in 1865, that
victory has suffused the purposes of the North throughout the war and before. The story has been settled upon, assuming Ll-ie shape of an elaborate
play. Every American schoolchild learns the set pieces, the way that generals and presidents personified various traits: Grant's cool purposefulness, Lee's selfless dedication to homeland, Sherman's prescient destructiveness, Lincoln's forgiveness and suffering.
Yet things may not have been so settled. The contingencies of the war,
we might recognize, could easily have changed not only the outcome of
the conflict but its apparent moral meaning as well. If the North had
27 A counterargument that has received McPherson's endorsement is Mark Grimsley, The
Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, I86I-I865 (Cambridge,
1995).
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overwhelmed the South in 1862, the victory would have brought the restoration of the Union without the immediate end of slavery. If that had
happened, the war's causes as well as its outcome would be understood
differently today. Similarly, if Lincoln had escaped assassination and had
overseen the conciliatory form of Reconstruction he seemed to have had
in mind, he likely would not appear to be the transcendental visionary
he is considered now. Not only events were contingent, in other wordsso were apparently fixed ideologies, values, personalities, and memories.
With one key victory, after all, George McClellan might well be pictured
on classroom walls throughout a very different kind of United States. 28
We might rethink, too, the role of modernity in causing and deciding
the war. Modernity is perhaps the single most deeply embedded part of
the standard story; Americans o(all regions and generations, for different
reasons, accept the idea that the North was a modem society that could
not long coexist with a South that had rejected modernity. McPherson, for
example, divides the country into two halves with different orientations
toward "modernization." He characterizes that process as one marked by
"an evolution from the traditional, rural, village-oriented system of personal and kinship ties, in which status is 'ascriptive' (inherited), toward a
fluid, cosmopolitan, impersonal, and pluralistic society, in which status is
achieved by merit." A 1996 book that offers "everything you need to know
about America's greatest conflict but never learned" boils things down
this way: "The America of the Union states was racing toward the twentieth
century, with banks, booming factories, railroads, canals, and steamship
lines.... The southern states of the Confederacy were, in many respects,
standing still in time." The prominent historian George Fredrickson has argued that a modem society such as the North, in conflict with a nonmodem or less modem society such as the South, will benefit from modernity
in wartime because "its greater social mobility and emphasis on achievement will bring to the fore more effective leaders, and its more highly differentiated structure of soc.ial and occupational roles will make possible a
more efficient allocation of tasks." 29
Such views may give modernity more credit than it deserves as the driving force behind freedom and military victory. Modem economies, after
all, have often found ways to make their peace with nondemocratic gov28 Battlefield contingency is the major analytic argument in McPherson's Battl.e Cry of
Freedom, where he posits four points at which the North could have lost the war; see pp. 85758.
29 McPherson makes this point explicitly in Ordeal by Fire, 13, and implicitly in Batt/,e Cry of
Freedom; Kenneth C. Davis, Don't Know Much about the Civil War: Everything Thu Need to Know
about America's Greatest Conflict but Never Learned (New York, 1996), 151-52; George Fredrickson, "Blue over Gray: Sources of Success and Failure in the Civil War," in A Nation Divided:
Probl.ems and Issues of the Civil War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis, 1975), 78.
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ernment, coercive labor, and constrained liberties. And while the events
of the twentieth century show that a technologically sophisticated, "highly
differentiated" society can become a terrifyingly effective war machine,
Americans have learned that more advanced societies do not always triumph over less developed enemies. If the South had won the Civil War, in
fact, historians could plausibly argue that a defensive, highly mobilized,
self-sacrificing, organic South would naturally defeat the commercial, aggressive, polyglot, individualistic North, with its draft riots, paid substitutes, and indecisive president. They would look to the American Revolution as foreshadowing the inevitable success of the Confederacy-just as
the Confederates themselves did.
Even this counterfactual perspective does not go far enough, for it neglects how "modern" the slave South itself had become by the late antebellum period. This topic has been hotly debated by historians for decades,
revealing that modernity is among the most slippery of concepts, especially as it related to slavery. It seems fair to say that from the perspective
of most other societies in the world in 1860, the slave South was an advanced society, rich in the machinery and trappings of modernity. Railroads, telegraphs, cities, newspapers, active political parties, factories, and
reform societies emerged in the 1840s and i 8 50s. Slavery grew no weaker
as a result, however, showing itself dismayingly adaptable. Where the incentives existed, as in Virginia, slaves were put to work in the machinery of
the new age, laboring in industries such as iron foundries. White Southerners considered themselves a progressive people, taking the best of the
new while maintaining social stability and responsibility for their workers.
They prided themselves on their white democracy, their widespread church
membership, and their strict adherence to the Constitution. They saw
themselves on a different, smoother, more humane path to progress. 30
Modernity, slavery, and nation appeared in strange combinations in the
secession crisis and war. Some of the largest planters and richest slave areas in the Deep South tended to be Unionist, whereas cities, where modern ways had made the greatest inroads in the slave South, often voted for
secession. The machinery of print and telegraph, rather than moderating
the opinions of city dwellers and inclining them toward freedom, could inflame them against the North. The most heavily Unionist districts, for their
part, were those least connected to the South and the rest of the nation;
30 Richard Graham, "Economics or Culture? The Development of the U.S. South and
Brazil in the Days of Slavery," in Kees Gispen, ed., What Made the South Different? (Oxford, Miss.,
1990). For insightful portrayals of "modem" influences in the South, see Thom ton, Politics
and Power; Eugene D. Genovese, The Slaveholders' Dilemma: Freedom and Progress in Southern Conservative Thought, r820-r860 (Columbia, S.C.; 1992); and Kenneth W. Noe, Southwest Virginia Railroad: Modernization and the Sectional Crisis (Urbana, Ill., 1994).
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up-country people seemed bound to older ideas of nation, not newer ones.
Once the war began, the Confederacy innovated quickly on the battlefield, on the oceans, and behind the lines, even as it held stubbornly to
slavery.
There is no doubt that the North was more economically developed
than the South and that slavery rendered the South economically backward by comparison. But seeing the war as a conflict between the future
and the past tempts us to think that modernity naturally, if often violently,
creates freedom. It tempts us to bifurcate and simplify the causes of the
war into easy-to-understand formulas that flatter Americans, including
white Southerners, into thinking that things unfolded pretty much as they
were destined to unfold. It conflates slavery with the agrarian past and ignores the viruslike ability of slavery to insinuate itself into diverse kinds of
societies. An interpretation based on modernization ignores how intertwined North and South, black and white, and slavery and freedom were
in antebellum America.
Slavery and freedom remain the keys to understanding the war-but
they are the place to begin our questions, not end them. The interpretation of the Civil War that appeals to so many Americans today weaves
antislavery sentiments, war, economic progress, and nationalism into an
inseparable whole. Freedom, it seems, was driven by the machinery of
modern life, achieved through cathartic violence, and embodied in a
government that valued freedom above all else. The triumph, moreover,
seems to have operated retroactively. A nation that tolerated slavery at
its founding can seem, in retrospect, fundamentally opposed to slavery. A
national economy that for generations depended on slavery as its mainspring can seem intrinsically antagonistic to slavery. A war that began as a
fight to maintain the Union with strong protections for slavery can be seen
as inherently antislavery from the beginning. Given these assumptions, a
conflagration on the scale of the Civil War appears inevitable.
Those who resist this argument, its assumptions, and its implications are
often conservatives of various kinds. Some are white Southerners unwilling, as they see it, to abandon their ancestors and their heritage. Other
critics resent the power of the national government and are jealous for the
power of states and localities. 31 Others are racists, denying to blackAmeri31 Jeffrey Rogers Hummel offers iconoclastic and penetrating commentary on the war in
his Emancipating Slaves, Enslaving Free Men: A History of the American Civil War (Chicago, 1996).
Hummel, from the viewpoint of one who finds the market and its values more just and
efficient than the state and its values, challenges some of the orthodoxies of the liberal interpretation. He argues that a war to maintain the Union alone was not the worthy crusade
it often appears: "As an excuse for civil war, maintaining the State's territorial integrity is
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cans the freedoms and aspirations available to other Americans. As a
result, liberals have stood staunchly behind the standard interpretation,
hoping it can help strengthen the activism and authority of the national
government, the claims of African Americans for full citizenship, and the
tradition of white reform.
Perhaps, however, the standard interpretation is no longer serving liberal ends as it once did. The story of the Civil War has become a story of
things being settled, of scores being righted. Movies and books that tell of
Americans killing more than six hundred thousand other Americans somehow convey a sense of the greatness of everyone concerned and of the nation for which they died. Such faith in the transformative effects of warfare
can make it easier for Americans to find other wars natural and inevitable.
Celebrating the martyrdom of whites for black freedom can reduce white
guilt. Celebrating the bravery of Confederate soldiers and the brilliance of
Confederate generals can trivialize the stakes of the war. Celebrating sectional reconciliation can mask the struggles over justice, power, and arrogance that have marked relations between the North and the South for
generations.
A new Civil War revisionism may help us avoid some of these temp~
tions. That revisionism, unlike its predecessors, might focus on the w<iY
we relate the Civil War rather than on matters of interpretation alone. It
might resist the very notion of the war as a single story, with a beginning,
middle, and end, with turning points and near misses. The war did nPt
have a single chronology, a rising and falling, an obvious pivot, but rath~r
competing and intertwining chronologies in different theaters, on different home fronts, in politics and in economy. The sequence of sectional
crisis, war, and aftermath did not follow a cumulative and linear development. To some, war seemed less impending in 1859 than in 1854, less
threatening in February of 1861 than in November of 1860. The w:lr
seemed more pointedly about slavery in late 1863 than it did six montl1 S
later when the presidential election in the North threatened to capsize tJ:Le
Lincoln administration. Black freedom promised more liberation in i 8e5
than it had delivered by 1876.
bankrupt and reprehensible" (352). Hummel believes that the war was not the only, or even
the best, way of ending slavery, pointing out that the amount of money the North alone spen!
on the war "was enough to buy all slaves and set up each family with forty acres and a mule
(354). The source of his dissent, reflected in his title, is that "in contrast to the whittling a~Y
of government that had preceded Fort Sumter, the United States had commenced its halti?g
but inexorable march toward the welfare-warfare State of today" (359). Hummel's notes<~
the historical literature are often biting, but his narrative of the war's coming, fighting, ar1
aftermath does not differ markedly from more conventional accounts. His political perspective has revealed to him the evasions and conventions of the current orthodoxy and suggested promising areas for further reflection and research, but he has not yet offered a coherent countemarrative of the conflict.

Worrying about the Civil War
A new revisionism might also set aside the Olympian perspective and
voice of our dominant books and films to provide a different sense of the
war's depth and scale. It might give up older reassurances to provide new
kinds of clarity. It might convey what Stephen Crane's Red Badge of Courage
conveyed-the swirl of action and reflection, the partial knowledge of
those swept up in war. A new revisionism might inspire battle histories that
leave some of the fog of battle on the page.
A new revisionism would place more distance between nineteenthcentury Americans and ourselves, the very distance that lets us see ourselves
more clearly. If Americans resist the temptation to count every cost of the
Civil War as a "sacrifice," we might be more grateful for our simple good
fortune and perhaps less self-satisfied with the people we have become. If
we acknowledge that we inherit all the past and not merely those parts we
like to call our "heritage," we would better respect the past's complexity,
weight, and importance. Ifwe recognize that the Civil War did not represent the apotheosis of American ideals, we might look for that culmination
in the future rather than in the past. All we need is the faith to approach
these threatening years without a comforting story already in hand.

